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From Causality to Emergence: 
Re-evaluating social media’s role in the 2011 English riots 
 
Stephanie Alice Baker 
 
This paper is an attempt to re-evaluate the role of social media on the riots. It draws 
upon interviews and qualitative analysis of tweets posted during the riots to examine 
how digital modalities reconfigure power relations between vulnerable and 
invulnerable populations as collectives seek to enact social change. The importance 
of social media for understanding collective action, I argue, lies in its relevance for 
conveying what one could call the performativity of public space. My thesis emerges 
in response to the rise of big data analytics as a means to predict and respond to 
political unrest, exploring the limits of predictive analyses with regard to issues of 
trust, power, memory and emotions. My claim is that understanding the power of the 
digital requires a more sophisticated understanding of emotions. To this end, I 
emphasize the need to employ multi-method approaches to study new forms of 
“mediated crowd” membership that combine digital methods with more traditional 
approaches to emotions research. 
 
Commentary on the role of social media in orchestrating the riots 
 
Much has been speculated about the role of social media in orchestrating the 2011 
English riots. While England has an established history of rioting, the unprecedented 
speed and scale with which the riots escalated meant that new media technologies 
were targeted as an object of blame. Speaking in the House of Commons, British 
Prime Minister, David Cameron (2011) declared, “Everyone watching these horrific 
actions will be struck by how they were organised via social media.” Journalists and 
politicians echoed these sentiments with David Lammy, the local MP for Tottenham, 
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claiming that the riots were an attack on the whole of the Tottenham community 
“organised on Twitter” (Mackenzie, 2011). As the country tried to make sense of the 
riots, the impression emerged of a technologically-obsessed, deviant youth culture, 
“Twitter rioters” (France & Flynn, 2011), responsible for what was referred to as the 
“Facebook riot” (Bowcott, et al., 2011) and the “BlackBerry Riots” (Economist, 2011). 
As Philip Blond (2011) put it: 
 
The riots were new in that gangs of predominately young unemployed 
men were able, using new media, to launch a series of semi-
organised disturbances for the purpose not of protest, but of criminal 
gain.  
 
Political discourse, most of which was ground in speculation and nineteenth-century 
crowd theory (Baker, 2012a), created something of a moral panic with calls to switch 
off social media platforms during the height of the disorder, replaced shortly after by 
suggestions that social media played “little” (Adegoke & Ball, 2011) or “no role” in the 
unrest (Thomas, 2011).  
 
Commentary of this kind was premised on big data analytics. Digital methods were 
used to ‘mine’ key words (e.g. riot, revenge) across large data sets beyond the scope 
of traditional social scientific methods. While the Metropolitan Police (2012) 
discovered several references to riots organized on social media, it was hardly 
enough to warrant serious scholarly attention.i Instead, consensus emerged that it 
was Blackberry’s encrypted Messenger service (BBM), rather than social networking 
sites as originally presumed, that was rioters’ preferred mode of communication 
(Cellan-Jones, 2011). In what follows I point to the inadequacy of these methods, as 
a means to understand the role of social media on the riots.  
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The Social Life of Methods 
 
Methods enact social worlds; that is to say, they simultaneously represent and enact 
the very objects they seek to describe (Ruppert et al., 2013). The same is true of the 
recent riots. The suggestion that social media played an insignificant role in the 
events is a direct reflection of the digital methods (e.g. Sentiment Analysis and big 
data analytics) employed to study the events. Big data is increasingly identified as an 
untapped resource. Metaphors of data ‘mining’ and ‘harvesting’ point to the value 
that can be extracted from digital resources for crisis management purposes, 
particularly with regard to social media technologies, such as, Twitter. Twitter’s open-
access policy makes the micro-blogging site a popular medium through which to 
examine the expression of public emotion. Given that social movements are 
concerned primarily with collective emotions, attempts to predict and manage crises 
tend to focus on the early detection of public emotion on these digital platforms. 
 
Digital methods are typically premised on the notion of emotions as states. The idea 
is that feelings - in this case, anger or grievance - are made manifest in emotion 
words (e.g. ‘anger’ or ‘revenge’). The problem with this view is not only that it fails to 
account for non-conscious or pre-reflective emotions; but that in reducing emotions 
to feelings these methods neglect the very processes they seek to predict and 
describe. In the case of the riots, the reduction of agency to those feelings visibly 
expressed on digital devices and platforms led to futile debates about whether social 
media caused the unrest. By focussing on issues of causality, as exemplified by the 
quantification of feelings and riot-related terms, it was concluded that social media 
was of little significance to the unrest. Arguments of this kind were similarly 
articulated with regard to the ‘Arab Spring’ with initial suggestions that social media 
ignited these movements rebutted by those who emphasised the human dimension 
of revolution - “the revolution will not be tweeted,” as one commentator pointed out 
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(Gladwell, 2010). 
 
To ask whether social media caused the riots risks succumbing to technological 
determinism. Equally suggestions that twitter is merely a tool through which to 
communicate is to miss the capacity of the medium to transform how users perceive, 
experience and respond to social life. Certainly people are capable of rioting without 
digital technologies. One only needs to reflect on the history of rioting in Britain, for 
example, to defend such a point. But these approaches tell us very little about the 
ways in which social media affected people’s experience of the riots, the 
consequence of which was to overlook the impact that these mediums had on the 
events. If emotions were states, then big data analytics would provide a useful way to 
measure changes in public emotion. If, however, emotions are not states, but 
processes – what Jack Barbalet (2002: 1) terms “an experience of involvement” – 
then our concern should not be with ‘mining’ emotion words, but rather with 
understanding the affective processes through which collective action emerges.  
 
Alternative Approaches to understand the affective dynamics of the riots  
 
Emotions are notoriously difficult to measure and define. Despite being neither 
inevitable, nor automatic, there are key factors that contribute to their emergence. 
Understanding these factors, and how they were communicated across digital 
devices and platforms during the riots, is crucial to comprehending the impact of 
social media on such events. When we talk about emotions we invoke a strong 
biographical dimension that draws upon our experience of involvement with the 
social world. Our commitment to these experiences varies for individuals, drawing on 
value commitments cultivated in life. We have to be strongly committed to values, as 
Hans Joas (2012) points out, if the word value-commitment is itself to hold any value. 
There is a parallel here between our commitment to particular values and our 
	 5	
commitment to particular persons or symbols, which can only be comprehended or 
communicated in narrative form.  
 
Emotions give meaning to actions. Meaning is attributed to actions against the 
background of extant collective representations. In dramaturgical terms, actors 
communicate meaning to audiences who interpret the present by harvesting the past 
and anticipating the future. If the meaning ascribed to events involves intersecting 
temporalities, then emotions are concerned not so much with an isolated present as 
re-evaluating our affective experiences in light of our memories (individual and 
collective). Emotional memories – their dissemination across social media platforms - 
played a crucial part in the riots. The riots drew on a legacy of collective emotional 
memories made meaningful in relation to a history of perceived police brutality. What 
is important here is not only the memories that rioters shared, but how Duggan’s 
death was framed in relation to these collective representations. It was not Duggan’s 
death as an isolated incident in August 2011 that caused the unrest, but rather how 
the incident came to represent a broader narrative of social injustice. Duggan’s death 
could only rupture the social imagination if the incident affected significant parts of 
society - the image of Duggan as a martyr of illegitimate policing perceived to signify 
a legacy of racial discrimination and inequality. 
 
Performative Politics and the Battle for Public Space 
 
Digital modalities reconfigure power relations between vulnerable and invulnerable 
populations. While theories of power tend to be conceived in terms of govermentality 
and surveillance, my focus here is on the performative qualities of the digital: namely, 
how digital technologies altered the ways in which the riots were experienced and 
enacted. Conceiving of the riots as a mode of performative politics requires a more 
nuanced understanding of the occupation of public space as both a physical and 
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symbolic space, and the symbolic power exercised by those that occupied these 
spaces as forms of resistance 
 
• The occupation of physical public space was evident during the protests that 
took place outside Tottenham Hale police station on 6 August, two days after 
Duggan was fatally shot by police, which latter escalated into rioting and 
looting across much of the country. These actions involved physically 
occupying the streets and torching police cars as visible acts of defiance that 
highlighted the public’s rejection of State power and authority.  
 
• Symbolically, these acts involved a rejection of the negative representations 
of Mark Duggan put forward by various authorities (journalists, politicians and 
police), and the representation of aggrieved individuals as a fused public.  
 
This is where social media played a significant role in the riots, not merely in terms of 
concrete social relations but the occupation of digital devices and platforms as public 
spaces through which to access, and to intervene in, the social. By undermining 
authorities’ claims to represent the public, digital technologies reconfigured power 
relations between vulnerable and invulnerable populations. With regard to emotions 
what is important here is the notion of public space as a shared arena through which 
to re-define meaning in narrative form. The digital object is conceived here as more 
than a single tweet, it may refer to the corpus of tweets (both visual and textual) that 
constitute a meaningful narrative. What is at stake in these online public spaces is 
not merely power in the sense of control and domination, but the capacity to be 
communicatively understood. 
 
I propose reading the riots as a battle over the representation of Mark Duggan’s 
death, one performed not merely in physical space but through mediated forms of 
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interaction. Social media was fundamental to the narrative structure of events, 
forming part of a dialogue with old media that materialised into concrete social 
relations. Here, the riots may be read as a battle over competing definitions of 
legitimacy, more specifically, a rejection of representations put forward in the 
mainstream media by politicians, journalists and police.  
 
My claim is that the riots emerged in a way that was neither predictable, nor visible in 
speech-acts alone. Instead, the events assumed highly symbolic (visual) forms as 
counter-narratives, reinforced and made meaningful in relation to a series of rumours 
circulating across social media, culminating in the alleged police attack upon a 16-
year old black girl posted on YouTube, Facebook and twitter. Of particular 
significance was the public’s rejection of several allegations: 
 
1. First, the IPCC’s initial claim that Duggan shot first at police.  
2. Second, what became known as the assassination rumour: an inaccurate 
media report published by the Evening Standard, the day after Duggan was 
killed, that described him being assassinated by police in an execution style.  
 
The new media ecology in which Duggan was killed had a significant impact on the 
riots (Baker, 2014). While assassination rumors have recurrently emerged as triggers 
for public disorder, 24-hour news coverage, together with the ubiquity of digital 
devices and platforms, characterised by user-generated content and interactive 
social networking sites, provided a fertile environment for rumors to gain currency 
and momentum. The fact that rumors regarding Duggan’s assassination were not 
rebutted until 3 days after his death, enabled the image of Duggan as a victim of 
illegitimate policing to circulate via these mediums throughout the community. Here, 
representation assumes a Platonic sense of the term with the riots signifying an 
attempt to re-present - to correct - false representations put forward by various 
	 8	
authorities in the mainstream media, a form of performative politics that in 
highlighting the perceived disconnect between narratives themselves contributed to 
the unrest. Counter-representations communicated via new media aimed not only to 
replace ‘false’ representations with a more accurate version of events, digital devices 
and platforms engendered a process of self-constitution by enabling fragmented 
users across vast temporal and spatial geographies to fuse as victims of illegitimate 
policing (despite being a plural citizenry), thereby, emerging as protagonists in the 
drama.  
 
The incentive to riot is predicated on the collective recognition of perceived social 
injustice, the recognition that the object represented also represents you - the 
Facebook page established during the 2011 Egyptian uprising: “We are all Khaled 
Said,” a case in point. Collective representations disseminated on social media 
platforms facilitated this process of mimetic vertigo, evoking pity for the victim as one 
like ourselves. In Duggan’s case, representing his death via these mediums evoked 
outrage on an unprecedented scale, transpiring into collective action both online and 
off. In fact, a common feature of the 2010-12 protest movements was that these 
forms of mediated crowd membership emerged in response to a perceived Social 
tragedy, wherein the interactive relationships enabled by digital technologies 
connected aggrieved users into intense social relationships (Baker, 2014). This is not 
to suggest that mediated crowd membership is unique to social media. All forms of 
crowd behaviour are mediated with more traditional forms of media – television and 
radio configuring the 1992 LA riots and the 2005 French riots respectively. What is 
novel is the ubiquitous ownership of digital devices, which make instant messenger 
services and 24-hour online social networking sites powerful tools to mobilise and 
sustain collective action through rapid, multimedia messages that can be 
communicated en masse.  
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The proliferation of digital devices and platforms means that we are increasingly 
susceptible to being influenced indirectly by these mediums in our physical 
interactions with users, who restructure our experience without consensus or online 
participation. The indirect effect of social media was articulated by respondents who 
recalled their exposure to the riots: 
 
It wasn’t through the news. My brother told me about the protest at 
Tottenham and showed me pictures. These were mostly through 
BlackBerry notifications from my brother and speaking to the 
community activists helped me to get a perspective as to why it 
happened. These images were very powerful (Baker, 2012b). 
 
Crucial here is the fact that the percentage of the population consuming tweets is not 
reducible to the amount of registered twitter users. In the new media ecology, even if 
one does not use social media directly, online social networks inexorably impact their 
offline lives. Interviews reveal that the power of twitter was largely derived from the 
fact that in allowing user generated content social media was associated with friends 
and family, rendering the medium a powerful cultural resource through which to 
facilitate truth, trust and authority (though it is evident that social media can equally 
uphold traditional power structures and operate as a vehicle for moral traditional 
forms of broadcasting).  
 
Conclusion 
 
• In this paper I have focussed on the performative qualities of the digital, 
exploring how these technologies altered the ways in which the riots were 
perceived, experienced and enacted.  
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• Re-evaluating the power of new media technologies to inform collective 
action indicates that while not the cause of the riots, social media resulted in 
substantive effects.  
• In the case of the riots, video footage uploaded onto YouTube, Facebook, 
Twitter provided alternative representations of the events to those put forward 
in the mainstream media, while hashtags and public pages on social media 
services revealed that the views of a minority were shared by a much larger 
majority.  
• By revealing the extent of discontent, digital technologies enabled emotions 
to gather force and momentum, facilitating feelings of solidarity and 
empowering collective action. This more reflexive approach to social media’s 
role in riots shifts the question from one of causality to emergence, a concern 
with the role digital devices and platforms play in the organization of 
contemporary sociality.  
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